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REGULATION OF BUSINESS-SHERMAN ACT-EXPANSION OF PER SE DOCTRINE 
OVER TYING AGREEMENTS-Through congressional grant defendant's pred-
ecessor acquired approximately forty million acres of land, consisting of 
every alternate section in a twenty to forty mile wide belt on each side of its 
railroad track from Lake Superior to Puget Sound. Defendant sold about 
thirty-seven million acres of its holdings and leased the balance. Many 
of the sales contracts and most of the leases, together covering several 
million acres of land, contained "preferential routing" clauses1 which 
compelled the grantee or lessee to ship all commodities produced or 
manufactured on the land over defendant's lines, unless competitors' 
rates were lower or, in some instances, unless their services were better.2 
In an action for injunctive relief by the government, charging that defend-
ant's "preferential routing," or tying, agreements were unlawful as un-
reasonable restraints of trade in violation of section I of the Sherman 
Act,3 the district court granted the government's motion for summary 
1 As of 1949 "preferential routing" clauses were contained in over 103 contracts for 
the sale of timber and timberland covering 1,344,722 acres, over 64 mineral leases covering 
more than 147,071 acres and over 1,000 grazing leases covering more than 1,000,000 acres. 
2 Some of the mineral leases required such shipment only if defendant's rates, service 
and facilities were equal to those of any competing line. 
3 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1. The dissenting opinion points out that 
tied transportation would not be covered by §3 of the Clayton Act which relates only 
to "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities ..•. " 38 Stat. 
731 (1914), 15 u.s.c. (1952) §14. 
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judgment. On appeal, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting and one 
justice not sitting. Tying agreements are per se unreasonable whenever 
a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product 
(land) to restrain appreciably free competition in the market for the tied 
product (transportation) and a not insubstantial amount of interstate 
commerce is affected. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I 
(1958). 
Traditionally courts have confined the sweeping language of section 
I of the Sherman Act to those contracts or combinations which unreason-
ably restrain trade.4 However, since early common law such restrictive 
practices as price-fixing,5 division of markets6 and group boycotts7 have 
been condemned as per se illegal, without reference to the quantity of 
commerce affected, because of the extremely anticompetitive nature or 
character of these restraints.8 Until 1947 the status of tying agreements9 
appears to have fluctuated between these two extremes.10 At that time the 
tying of $500,000 worth of business in an unpatented product to leases 
of more than nine hundred patented machines was struck down by sum-
mary judgment in International Salt Co. v. United States11 on the theory 
that it was unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any sub-
stantial market. Six years later impressive dicta in Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States12 elaborated and pointed out that the gravamen 
of the Sherman Act offense is the supplier's enjoyment of a monopolistic 
or dominant position in the market for the tying product coupled with 
the restraint of a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product. 
Thus a cleavage developed in the law. Tying arrangements are per se 
unreasonable only when there is domination in a market and a substantial 
volume of commerce is restrained, but for no other violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act is it necessary to establish either of these elements.13 
4 E.g., Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
5 E.g., United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
6 E.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., (6th Cir. 1898) 85 F. 271, mod. 
and affd. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
7 E.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
s See Schueller, "The New Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and Patent 
Misuse," 50 CoL. L. REV. 170 at 172 (1950). 
9 Lockhart and Sacks, "The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether 
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act," 65 HARV. L. REv. 913 at 
944 (1952), define a tying contract as an arrangement whereby a supplier furnishes a 
product over which he usually has some degree of market control on condition that the 
user or dealer also purchases a tied product that would otherwise be available from the 
supplier's competitors. 
10 See 48 CoL. L. REv. 733 (1948), for the history of tying arrangements at common 
law and under the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. 
11 332 U.S. 392 at 396 (1947). 
12 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
13 See Handler, "Recent Antitrust Developments," 9 N.Y.C. BAR AssN. REC. 171 at 
178 (1954). 
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This gap was significantly narrowed by the Court in the principal case 
through substituting a showing of "sufficient economic power to impose 
an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product"H for 
the former dual requisites of a per se violation. The Court, however, 
expressly approves the earlier approach and feels its decision adds to, 
and does not overrule, prior law.15 Contrary to the dissenting opinion,16 
interpretations of former decisions17 and writers,18 the Court concluded 
that International Salt did not treat a patent as the equivalent of proof 
of the necessary market control over the tying product, but condemned 
tying arrangements "despite the fact that the tying item was patented, 
not because of it."19 To accept this conclusion and to rule out any theory 
that analogizes the particular tract of land involved in each purchase or 
lease to a patent on the basis that such land is so unique that it constitutes 
the relevant market,20 renders it difficult to determine how the govern-
ment has established the necessary market control over the tying product 
in both the principal case and previous patent cases. Such a finding here 
would seem necessarily to involve some inquiry into the relative land 
market,21 but the summary disposition of the case precluded such an 
inquiry. The new test as applied to the facts of the principal case, how-
ever, can be justified on the theory that a tying agreement would be in-
effective unless the supplier possesses substantial market power over the 
tying product.22 
The real economic advantages that can accompany exclusive dealing 
and requirements contracts, as opposed to tying agreements,23 indicate 
that the new "sufficient economic power" test will be limited to tying agree-
ments. Conversely, the growing reluctance of the courts to engage in ex-
14 Principal case at 11. 
15 Id. at 8-11. 
16Id. at 17 and 18. 
17 See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
18 See 57 YALE L. J. 1298 at 1300 (1948). 
19 Principal case at 9. 
20 Justice Harlan, in the dissenting opinion in the principal case, at 18 and 19, 
interprets the majority opinion as rejecting the common law fiction of the uniqueness 
of land. But see 9 STAN. L. REv. 539 at 543 (1957), for the position that the district court 
accepted this fiction. 
21 The dissenting opinion in the principal case, at 15 and 16, calls for evidence of 
both the strength of defendant's landholdings relative to that of others in the appropriate 
land market and the uniqueness of defendant's holdings in terms of quality or use, in 
addition to any other circumstances that put defendant in a ,trategic position as against 
other sellers and lessors of land. 
22 If this -market power were absent, consumers or dealers could have merely pur-
chased the tying product from suppliers who did not extract a tying agreement. See 
Lockhart and Sacks, "The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether 
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act," 65 HARV. L. REv. 913 at 
944 (1952), and Bowman, "Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem," 67 YALE 
L. J. 19 at 31 (1957). 
23 See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, note 17 supra, at 305. 
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tensive economic inquiry,24 and the arguable position that such inquiry 
is not required to establish per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act,25 tend to indicate that the new test will not be so confined. If the 
Court is attempting to bridge the division between former decisions 
dealing with tying arrangements and all other types of per se violations, 
its language, coupled with its approval of the summary disposition of the 
case, will leave courts and lawyers in grave doubt as to the proper stand-
ards for judging tying clauses under section 1 of the Sherman Act.26 
Max H. Bergman, S.Ed. 
24 Id. at 308, and the dissenting opinion at 322; principal case at 4-6. 
25 See 55 COL. L. REv. 561 at 563 (1955). 
26 See the dissenting opinion in the principal case at 19. 
